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MAJOR PROFESSOR: Dr. Kevin Sylwester 
This paper examines the relationship between the incidences of violent crime and the 
level of drug enforcement. To do this, the paper compiles a panel dataset from 30 large cities 
across the US and using fixed effect regression analyzes the dataset. The paper finds that 
increase in drug enforcement does not lead to significant or noticeable decrease in violent crime 
offenses. Specifically, the paper finds that the relationship between drug enforcement and violent 
crime offenses has a positive and significant contemporaneous relation although it is no longer 
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 In the recent history of the United States of America, the question of drug enforcement 
has never been too long out of the public discourse. From the Harrison Narcotics act of 1914 to 
the war on drugs by President Nixon to the calls over the last 5 to 10 years for decriminalization 
and legalization of marijuana, America has not been too far from the question of drug 
enforcement (Sacco 2014). With the recent decriminalization and legalization of marijuana in 
states across the United States, the question of whether the policies implemented over the last 
half a century worked to reduce crime needs to be asked. Although drug enforcement in general 
creates many effects, this paper considers one possible effect, namely the impact on crime. This 
paper adds to the existing research in this field by taking a more macro view and looking at the 
relationship between drug enforcement and violent crime in some of the most populous cities 
across the U.S. as opposed to focusing on specific states. 
 There has always been the perception that the level of drug use in a society could 
somehow predict the incidence of violent crime in that society. This has led to calls for strict 
drug enforcement policies like the three-strike rule as well as very harsh punishments for arrests 
on minor drug offenses to quell incidences of larger crimes (Sacco 2014). The question of the 
relation between various crimes and drug enforcement has been researched in various papers and 
the results will be summarized in the next section. This paper looks to understand the 
relationship between violent crime and drug enforcement. It shows that there is no significant 
relationship between the level of violent crime offenses in a city and the level of drug 
enforcement in that city. The paper uses data from 30 U.S cities for the years 1995 to 2014 to test 




paper will contain a literature review explaining what other researchers have done in the field, 








 Several papers have considered the impact of drug enforcement on crime. Werb et al 
(2011) conduct a systematic review of the available literature on drug law enforcement’s effect 
on drug violence. They found that increasing drug law enforcement is unlikely to reduce drug 
market violence. They found that the violence is an inevitable consequence of prohibition.  One 
reason for the small effects is that drug enforcement policies could have sizable indirect effects 
that offset the direct impact of the policy. They suggest that the policies put in place only serve 
to increase the incidences of other subsets of crimes like gun violence and high homicide rates. 
Yang (2008) shows that increases in enforcement of crimes induce displacements, while using 
the Philippines as a case study. The author shows that these displacements respond to the size of 
the illicit profits threatened by the increase in enforcement.  Such price increases could 
encourage more people to engage in these activities and so offset the direct impact of drug 
enforcement.  Silverman and Spruill (1977) show that based on data from Detroit, an increase of 
50% of the price of heroin would lead to an estimated increase of 14% in property crime. In fact, 
less enforcement might actually reduce crime.  Adda et al (2014) use a policy experiment in 
Lambeth to check the relationship between decriminalization of cannabis and crime. They find 
that decriminalization led to long-run reductions in crime in five nondrug areas. Resignato 
(2001) finds that drug related violent crime is based mostly on systemic factors that arise from 
the prohibition and enforcement of drug laws.  
Other studies reached similar conclusions when looking at single cities or states. Blackley 
and Shepard (2005) show that increasing drug enforcement in a bid to reduce crime in a location 




enforcement as a means of reducing the general crime level has an adverse effect on other types 
of crime. Lawton et al (2005) examine Operation Safe Streets as a case study for policing drug 
enforcement operations. This operation was conducted by the Philadelphia police department. 
The paper shows that the operation failed to have a significant impact on the level of violent 
crime throughout the city. However, the paper also shows that the local regions where the 
operations occurred benefitted and that crime in those specific areas went down. 
Other studies consider effects on non-violent crime such as property crime.  Benson and 
Rasmussen (1992,1994, 1995, 1998) reflect on the question of the effects of drug enforcement on 
property crime. Benson et al (1994) using Florida as a case study focuses on the opportunity cost 
of policing resources during a drastic increase in drug enforcement policies in the state. They 
find that as more resources are put into enforcement, contrary to popular belief, the level of 
property crime increases. This they believe is because of the opportunity cost of the scarce 
resources the police are using. Benson et al (2001) examine a similar issue in Florida but focus 
on a period of “normal” circumstances, meaning there was no increase in the policy of resources 
for drug enforcement.  They find that an increase in drug enforcement pulls scarce resources 
from areas like property crime enforcement and so increase these types of crimes. 
However, not all results are negative. Caulkins and Reuter (2010) explain that increases 
in enforcement work better when stopping a new market for drugs from starting in the first place. 
The authors speculate that it would be more profitable to start somewhere else instead of paying 
the very high entry fee required in a new, heavily policed market. They also conclude that 
enforcement increases for already established markets hit a point of diminishing returns when 




This paper looks to add to the research done by the other researchers in this field by 
taking a more macro view. Instead of focusing on one state and its policies, this paper uses 30 of 
the largest population centers in the U.S for the case study. The paper updates the data and uses 








DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 Consider the following equation:  
  
    ln(𝑜!") =∝ +𝛽 ln(𝑑𝑒!") + ∅𝑙𝑛𝑋!" 	+ 			 𝜖!" 
 
The equation states that the level of violent crime offences in city i at time t, denoted by 𝑜, is a 
function of the level of drug enforcement, de, and other explanatory characteristics, X.  Data for 
drug enforcement comes from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports and is the sum of the total 
number of violent crime offences reported in a specific city in the United States. The data is 
compiled from police precincts in the city and collated by the FBI. Violent crime offences 
include murder, forcible rape, robbery and assault. The de variable represents the drug 
enforcement variable which represents the relative level of police resources allocated to reduce 
drug crime. Drug enforcement is calculated by dividing the total number of drug arrests over the 
total number of arrests. The data for both numbers come from the Department of Justice. The 
expectation would be that there is a positive relationship between violent crime and drug 
enforcement. This assumption is made based of previous research done in enforcement and 
prohibition and their relationship to crime, as researchers like Rasmussen and Benson have 
shown in their works. 
Matrix X comprises population (pop), population density (popden), the unemployment 
rate (URate), and the percentage of the population that is white (%White).  The X variables are 
chosen to represent demographic and economic characteristics. The population and population 




higher the number of offenses. Moreover, perpetrators who commit crimes in more dense cities 
could find it harder to escape detection as shown Christens and Speer (2005). The unemployment 
rate controls for the economic conditions present.  A stronger economy is expected to lead to less 
crime (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001).  The data for the unemployment rate comes from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The percentage of a city that is white accounts for the demographic 
composition as well as an imperfect proxy for income (Manduca 2018).  Data comes from the 
Census Bureau.  The expectation is that there would be a negative relationship between 
percentage white and violent crime. Dummy variables for the 30 cities as well as for the 20 years 
are also included. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics.   
 
Table 1 – Summary Statistics 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
violent crime offences      11568.80 13329.29 
de 0.15 0.06 
Urate 6.64 2.95 
Pop 1101506.38 1109028.78 
popden 6133.84 7379.28 








Column one of Table 2 shows the fixed effect log regression results. The drug 
enforcement variable tests the hypothesis put forth that drug enforcement does not reduce the 
incidence of violent crime. In reading through the table, we find that the drug enforcement 
variable is positive and significant. From the data it can be shown that when there is a one 
standard deviation change in the magnitude of the drug enforcement variable, there is about a 
10.3% increase in the number of violent crime offenses11. This further expands on the results and 
its implication that continued increase in the level of drug enforcement means continued increase 
in the level of violent crime offenses. The regression also shows that the unemployment rate has 
a positive and insignificant relationship with violent crime. It indicates that the population 
variable has a positive and significant (to 0.01) relationship with the dependent variable. This 
means that as the population increases there is an increase in violent crime as expected. 
Population density has a negative relationship with violent crime which was expected, even 
though the value is not significant. An unexpected result is the fact that the percentage white 
variable has a positive relationship with violent crime, although it is not significant. 
 Column two replaces the right-hand side variables of column one with their lags so as to 
better address endogeneity concerns. The drug enforcement variable is negative and 
insignificant. This is the opposite of what was expected from the earlier regression results. A one 
standard deviation change in the drug enforcement variable has a very insignificant and 
negligible change in violent crime (about -0.029)2. The results of the lagged regression show 
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significant results in both the unemployment rate and population variables. The relationship 
between unemployment rate and violent crime is negative, which differs from the 
contemporaneous regression.  The coefficient on unemployment is also significant at the 0.01 
level. The population variable is positive as was expected and is significant at the 10% level.  
Population density, interestingly, has a negative relationship which was unexpected, even though 
it is not significant. The result for the percentage of a city that is white variable now has a 
negative relationship with violent crime, although it is not significant. The adjusted R2 of both 


































Table 2 – Regression Results 
============================================== 
                                    Dependent variable:                 
                    --------------------------------------------------- 
                         Contemporaneous               lagged           
(1)  (2)            
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
de                   0.175***                     -0.005                        
                                     (0.037)                       (0.031)             
                                                                        
URate                         0.067                          -0.261*** 
                                     (0.057)                       (0.053) 
                                                                        
pop                             0.724***                       0.071* 
                                     (0.261)                        (0.037) 
                                                                        
popden                      -0.014                              0.001 
                                     (0.207)                         (0.025) 
                                                                        
%White                       1.205                             -0.048 
                                     (1.393)                          (0.064) 
                                                                        
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations                   442                       441            
R2                            0.952                     0.949           
Adjusted R2                   0.945                     0.942           
Residual Std. Error     0.170 (df = 390)          0.175 (df = 387)      
F Statistic         150.765*** (df = 51; 390) 135.603*** (df = 53; 387) 
=================================================== 
3Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.  City and year dummies included in regressions but not 











 The relationship between the incidences of violent crime and the level of drug 
enforcement has been explored in this paper. It was shown that there is no negative relationship 
between the two, meaning that there is no evidence that tougher drug enforcement reduces crime. 
It needs to be stated that the results do not directly address causality as an increase in violent 
crime could cause an increase in the level of drug enforcement.  However, use of lagged 
enforcement at least partially addresses this issue.   
 The perception that violent crime is a result of drug use and as such the drug use should 
be combated first has had a negative effect on the policing situation in the country. As Benson et 
al (1994) show there is an opportunity cost of devoting more resources into drug enforcement as 
the available police resources are not infinite. Therefore, their resources need to be employed in 
the positions where they can provide the most social good.  This paper’s results provide 
skepticism that resources are being used in the most beneficial way.  Although this paper does 
not consider other policies4 that could reduce drug use, my results show no evidence that drug 
enforcement reduces crime. The lack of any strong effect casts doubt that drug enforcement is an 




4 Other policies could include support for treatment or wholesale decriminalization policies like 
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